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I. INTRODUCTION
The controversial decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment
from Terri Schiavo has been condemned by some disability rights orga-
nizations as unconscionable discrimination against people with disabili-
ties.' We think that this position is wrong as it applies to the saga of
Terry Schiavo 2 and potentially damaging for persons with disabilities in
a general sense. Terri Schiavo3 was a person with a disability.4 But the
contention that the case evidenced disability discrimination relies on
assumptions that are deeply problematic in regard to science, guardian-
ship, and surrogate decisionmaking law, and to achieving good for peo-
ple with serious cognitive disabilities. In this Article, we argue first that
* Ph.D., University of Michigan; J.D., University of Utah; Alfred C. Emery Professor of
Law, Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy, University of Utah.
** Ph.D., Johns Hopkins University; Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy, San
Francisco State University.
1. See, e.g., Brief of Not Dead Yet et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant and
Requesting Reversal at *1-2, Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004) (No. SC04-925), 2004
WL 1713757.
2. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1164-1165 (M.D. Fla.
2005); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (M.D. Fla. 2005); In re
Guardianship of Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182, 184-86 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003); In re
Guardianship of Schiavo, 800 So. 2d 640, 642-43 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001); In re
Guardianship of Schiavo (Schiavo 11), 792 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001); In re
Guardianship of Schiavo (Schiavo 1), 780 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
3. In what follows, we have chosen to refer to Terri Schiavo as "Terri Schiavo" for purposes
of dignity. To refer to her as "Terri," as many commentaries do encourages infantilization and
sentimentalization, rather than regarding her as the disabled woman she was. We owe this point
to Laurie Zoloth.
4. See 42 U.S.C § 12102(2)(A)(2006); see also discussion infra Part II.
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Terri Schiavo was properly viewed as a person with a disability, the
half-truth in the critics' view.5 We then demonstrate the flaws in the
critics' view by taking a disability rights perspective to explain the rea-
sons underlying the mistaken scientific, legal, and philosophical claims
that Schiavo was a case of disability discrimination.
The fundamental contention of advocates that Terri Schiavo was a
victim of disability discrimination construes the decision to withdraw
life-sustaining treatment as based on a judgment that her quality of life
was so poor that her life was no longer worth living.6 This claim has
consistently been advanced by Terri Schiavo's parents on the Web site
they created for maintaining her life and, subsequently, for right-to-life
advocacy on behalf of people with disabilities.7 This supposed judg-
ment about quality of life is sometimes erroneously taken to imply a
further claim to the effect that her life was less worthwhile, less worthy
of protection, or of reduced moral status.8 If, indeed, the decision to
terminate treatment was made on the basis that the quality of her life
was poor because of her disability - much less on the basis of the claim
that her life was less morally worthwhile because she was a person with
a disability - that decision would be problematic from the perspective of
both moral theory and disability law. To the contrary, arguments that
the Schiavo case reflected biased judgments about the quality of life of
disabled people rest on assumptions that are not helpful for defenders of
the civil rights of the disabled. Our strategy will be to argue that the
Schiavo case can only be deemed a case of disability discrimination if
we make assumptions that are unwarranted and deeply problematic. In
5. See Kathy L. Cerminara, Critical Essay: Musings on the Need to Convince Some People
with Disabilities That End-of-Life Decision-Making Advocates Are Not Out to Get Them, 37 Lov.
U. CHI. L.J. 343, 374-75 (2006) (claiming that Schiavo involved not a person with a disability, but
a "not abled" person); see also discussion infra Part H.
6. See, e.g., Brief of Not Dead Yet et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant and
Requesting Reversal, supra note 1, at * 1-2.
7. "Prominent disability rights advocates, right-to-life proponents and members of both the
healthcare and legal professions have long been warning the public of the intrinsic dangers of
forcing profoundly disabled people to die by withholding ordinary care - such as enteral
nourishment - from them." Pamela F. Hennessey, We Hate to Say We Told You So, TERRI
SCHINDLER SCHIAvO FOUND., http://www.terrisfight.org/news.php?id=71 (last visited Jan. 17,
2007).
8. To infer a claim about moral status from an assertion about quality of life requires a
further premise: that quality of life is determinative of moral status. Yet these claims are entirely
separate. People in severe pain, in impoverished circumstances, or in the deepest clinical
depression may be judged to have poor quality of life on many different grounds, but nothing
whatsoever follows about their moral status. The distinction between quality of life and moral
status is both recognized and blurred in many discussions of disability rights, medical treatment
decisions, and aid in dying. For example, the Web site of Not Dead Yet is headlined by the
observation that "legalized medical killing is often about a deadly double standard for people with
severe disabilities." Notdeadyet.org, http://www.notdeadyet.org (last visited Jan. 17, 2007).
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so doing, we hope to contribute to the literature that separates opposition
to disability discrimination from support for vitalist assumptions about
the overriding importance of preserving life. 9
I. TERRI SCHIAVO AS A PERSON WITH A DISABILITY
Some have argued that Terri Schiavo was not a person with a disa-
bility. Kathy Cerminara, for example, distinguishes people with disabil-
ities from people who are "not abled," applying the latter term to an
individual in permanent or persistent vegetative state ("PVS"). l0 Her
contention is that individuals in PVS have no conscious life at all and
hence have no reactions to or interests in treatment that affects conscious
life. " Therefore, Cerminara maintains, individuals in PVS have no abil-
ities whatsoever, as contrasted with individuals with lesser - that is,
"dis" - abilities. What is to be concluded about whether an individual in
PVS has interests and what those interests are, however - and we agree
with much of what Cerminara says on that point' 2 - is a different ques-
tion from whether that individual is a person with disabilities.
Contrary to Cerminara's claim, an individual in PVS is a living
human being who clearly meets the definition of "disability" under the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"): he or she has a physical or
mental condition that substantially limits a major life activity.' 3 Indeed,
someone in PVS would seem to have a severely limiting case of disabil-
ity as defined in the ADA because PVS is a condition that precludes
almost all major life activities, breathing or digesting excepted. As such,
a person in PVS meets the legal categorization for people with disabili-
ties. Accordingly, Cerminara's view is either a recommendation that
legal categorizations be changed or not a legal recommendation at all. It
would seem odd, however, to continue to categorize those in PVS as
''people" - generally a normative category - and to distinguish between
9. For an account of how the issues have become intertwined, see Cerminara, supra note 5,
at 344.
10. Id. at 374-75. The more common term here is "persistent vegetative state." See, e.g., J.1.
Fins., N.D. Schiff & K.M. Foley, Late Recovery from the Minimally Conscious State: Ethical and
Policy Implications, 68 NEUROLOGY 304 (2007); J.T. Glacino, The Vegetative and Minimally
Conscious States: Consensus-Based Criteria for Establishing Diagnosis and Prognosis, 19
NEUROREHABILITATION 293 (2004); J.T. Glacino & J. Whyte, The Vegetative and Minimally
Conscious States: Current Knowledge and Remaining Questions, 20 J. HEAD TRAUMA REHAB. 30
(2005); E. Jaul & R. Calderon-Margalit, Persistent Vegetative State and Dementia in the Elderly,
INT'L PSYCHOGERIATRICS, Jan. 19, 2007, at 1-8. We prefer the locution person "in PVS" because
it avoids the suggestion that the person is to be identified with the condition.
11. See Cerminara, supra note 5, at 350-51.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. 42 U.S.C § 12102(2)(A) (2006).
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"disabled," "not abled," and "abled" members of this category, as we
argue below.
If an individual in PVS is "disabled" under the ADA definition,
that person meets the statute's threshold condition for a claim of dis-
crimination. 4 This observation is, of course, part of the appeal of
Cerminara's contention that someone in PVS is not a person with disa-
bilities. If someone in PVS does not have a disability, that person does
not meet the minimum threshold for bringing suit under the ADA.'5
The possibility that every decision to terminate treatment for someone in
PVS may be subject to litigation under the ADA and perhaps barred by
the ADA as disability discrimination is troubling. This is particularly
true for those who believe that treatment withdrawals in such patients
are permissible in a wide range of circumstances, especially as a means
of respecting what people previously have clearly said about their
wishes. Putative protection that overrides peoples' ideas of their own
good easily slides into paternalism.
Despite its appeal, this "non-abled" strategy would seem to be a
problematic example of the tail wagging the dog; that is, of judgments
about what should be regarded as prohibited conduct under the ADA
driving judgments about who may be able to sue on such prohibited
conduct. The argument would go as follows: The ADA is not a statute
that was intended to block decisions to terminate medical treatment sim-
ply because a patient is a person with disabilities. Therefore, a certain
patient for whom the decision to terminate treatment might be permissi-
ble is not a person with disabilities for purposes of the ADA. But this
formulation of the argument is backwards because judgments about
what conduct is prohibited under the ADA would seem to be an inde-
pendent question from judgments about the scope of the definition of
disability under the ADA.
Moreover, there are clear examples of what would constitute disa-
bility discrimination against an individual in PVS that should be actiona-
ble under the ADA. Consider, for example, the decision of a state
government to refuse Medicaid payment for the treatment of a person in
PVS because of the catastrophic nature of his or her cognitive losses, or
a decision by a public entity such as a nursing home to refuse services to
such a person on the same grounds. To this extent, proponents of
regarding the Schiavo case as about disability have it right: Terri Schi-
avo was a person with a disability, and if the judgment to withdraw the
feeding tube had been made solely on this basis, it would have raised
questions about whether the door was being inappropriately opened to
14. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 477 (1999).
15. Id.
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non-treatment decisions against cognitively impaired individuals on the
basis of disability, as critics still contend. 6
Thus, identifying Terri Schiavo as a person with a disability, as
Samuel Bagenstos argues, opens up the possibility that at least one
aspect of the litigation was wrongly decided, namely, the federal district
court's judgment rejecting the Schindlers' final contention that the with-
drawal of the feeding tube violated the ADA. 7 The legal aspects of the
Schiavo case were long and complex. 8 The ADA claim appeared only
at the very end, just eight days before Terri Schiavo's death, when the
Schindlers filed an amended complaint petitioning the federal court to
grant a temporary restraining order, issue a declaratory judgment, and
grant permanent injunctive relief against the removal of and refusal to
reinsert Terri Schiavo's feeding tube.19 Count six of the Schindlers'
amended complaint contended that it was a violation of the ADA to
deny "necessary and appropriate rehabilitation services" to a person with
substantial disabilities.2" Count six also alleged that it was a violation of
the implementing regulations of the ADA for a guardian to authorize the
withdrawal of nutrition and hydration from a person with substantial
disabilities.21
The federal district court rejected the Schindlers' contentions in
count six. 22 Granting for the sake of argument that Terri Schiavo was a
qualified person with a disability and that the hospice was a public
accommodation for purposes of the ADA, the court concluded that the
removal of the feeding tube had not been "on the basis of' a disability. 3
Rather, the hospice's removal of the feeding tube was in response to a
Florida court order - just like the earlier removal and reinsertion of the
16. See Notdeadyet.org, supra note 8; see also Welcome to the Terri Schindler Schiavo
Foundation, (2006), http://www.terrisfight.org.
17. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Judging the Schiavo Case, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 457, 469 (2005).
18. See cases cited supra note 2 (appellate rulings in Schiavo case). See also generally Kathy
Cerminara & Kenneth Goodman, Schiavo Case Resources, Key Events in the Case of Theresa
Marie Schaivo, http://www6.niiami.edu/ethics/schiavo/timeline.htm (providing a comprehensive
timeline of Schiavo).
19. See Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order, Declaratory
Judgment, and Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief, Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo,
357 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (No. 8:05-CV-530-T-27TBM) (addressing counts one
through five), and 358 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (No. 8:05-CV-530-T-27TBM)
(addressing counts six through ten), 2005 WL 923185 [hereinafter Plaintiffs First Amended
Complaint]. This complaint was brought in federal court after An Act for the Relief of the Parents
of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005), granted the Middle District of
Florida jurisdiction over any suit brought under federal law challenging the removal of Terri
Scliavo's feeding tube. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 1378.
20. Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, supra note 19, In 77-80.
21. Id.
22. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler, 358 F. Supp. 2d at 1164-65.
23. Id. at 1165.
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tube.24 The court also rejected the Schindlers' reading of the ADA regu-
lations, pointing out that the regulations merely clarified that neither the
ADA nor the regulations altered federal law with respect to withdrawal
of nutrition and hydration by a guardian.2 5
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's interpretation and
agreed that the hospice had not withdrawn the feeding tube by reason of
Terri Schiavo's disability. 26 Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit went fur-
ther than the district court, opining that the ADA "was never intended to
provide an avenue for challenging court orders in termination of treat-
ment decisions" and that it was not a "medical malpractice" statute.27
The U.S. Supreme Court denied the Schindlers' petition for a stay,28 and
the case ended with Terri Schiavo's death.
In addition to contending that Terri Schiavo should be judged as a
person with a disability - a claim with which we agree - Bagenstos
argues that the court's treatment of the Schindlers' ultimate efforts to
litigate the case under the ADA was too hasty.29 Bagenstos' view is that
the case raised potentially legitimate claims under the ADA, a federal
statute, and that the courts should have at least granted the temporary
restraining order to allow these claims to be explored further. 3' Bagen-
stos argues that the judges acted hastily because they were frustrated by
the Schindlers' efforts to resurrect claims that had been already settled.3'
Bagenstos contends that the judges instead should have followed either
Congress' directions and re-litigated the federal law issues de novo, par-
ticularly the issues under the ADA, or attacked the constitutionality of
the federal statute directly, giving the Schindlers standing to bring suit in
federal court within thirty days to re-litigate any federal legal issues
raised by the removal of Teri Schiavo's feeding tube.
For this Article's purposes, we set aside the constitutional issues
raised by the congressional directive giving federal courts jurisdiction to
re-litigate issues already settled in state court.33 Our goal instead is to
consider whether there would have been any substance to an ADA claim
beyond the issues of guardianship and surrogate decisionmaking that
24. Id. at 1164. The court reached a parallel conclusion on the Schindlers' Rehabilitation Act
claim, not separately discussed here. Id. at 1165-66.
25. Id. at 1165 n.4.
26. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2005).
27. Id.
28. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 544 U.S. 957 (2005).
29. Bagenstos, supra note 17, at 457.
30. Id. at 458-459.
31. Id. at 471.
32. Id.
33. See An Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3,
119 Stat. 15 (2005).
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had already been litigated in state court.34 One way to argue that there
was substance to an ADA claim would be to read the ADA as a general
alteration of the balance of state and federal law with regard to guardian-
ship and surrogacy, affording a federal cause of action because decisions
are made with respect to a person with disabilities - rather than afford-
ing a federal cause of action based on an allegation that the decisions
discriminated against a person with disabilities. If the ADA is read this
way, then the federal courts should not have hastily dismissed the ADA
claim. The district court's reasoning on this point was twofold: first, the
hospice's decision to remove the feeding tube was not due to Terri Schi-
avo's disability; second, the Schindlers' reading of the ADA interpretive
regulations was mistaken.35 On the latter point, the district court was
clearly correct: the statement that the ADA does not authorize "the rep-
resentative or guardian of an individual with a disability to decline food,
water, medical treatment or medical services for that individual''36 sim-
ply clarifies the principle that the ADA is not to be understood as
authorizing non-treatment decisions. This does not, however, imply the
converse notion that the ADA requires representatives or guardians to
continue treatment. (This implication would be a fallacy: to say that X is
not authorized is not to say that not-X is required; not-X could be
required, authorized, or not authorized.) Indeed, the preceding section of
the regulations clarifies the other side of the question: nothing in the
ADA requires a person with disabilities or his or her surrogate deci-
sionmaker to accept services, either.37
Another way to argue that there was substance to the ADA claim
was to contend that the legal proceedings in the Schiavo case had evi-
denced disability discrimination. This is the more difficult question,
whether the Middle District of Florida and the Eleventh Circuit properly
resolved the contention that the hospice had acted based on Terri Schi-
avo's disability. On this point, each court gave a too-simple answer, an
answer which we believe is half-right and half-wrong. The Eleventh
Circuit's simple answer was that the hospice could not have acted on the
basis of Terri Schiavo's disability because the ADA "was never"
intended to serve as a basis for challenging non-treatment decisions.38
The district court's simple answer was that the hospice had not acted
based on Terri Schiavo's disability because it acted solely in accord with
34. See generally In re Guardianship of Schiavo (Schiavo 11), 792 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 2001); In re Guardianship of Schiavo (Schiavo 1), 780 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2001).
35. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1164-65 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
36. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(e)(2) (2006).
37. § 35.130(e)(1).
38. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2005).
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a court order, as it had done in the past in both removing and reinserting
the tube in response to other court orders.39
The Eleventh Circuit's assertion that the ADA "was never"
intended to serve as a basis for challenging non-treatment decisions is
overly broad. Rather, non-treatment decisions based on disability,
which are subject to challenge under the ADA, surely exist; an example
would be the challenges raised to initial versions of the Oregon Health
Plan.4 0 But there is at least a half-truth in the Eleventh Circuit's state-
ment that the ADA was not meant to derange the balance of federal and
state law with respect to guardianship and end-of-life decisionmaking.41
Nothing in the legislative history or interpretive regulations belies this
point. Indeed, the Department of Justice's issuance of the final rule
interpreting the ADA clarifies that the ADA does not alter federal law
regarding medical treatment decisions for persons with disabilities:
Some commenters expressed concern that § 35.130(e), which states
that nothing in the rule requires an individual with a disability to
accept special accommodations and services provided under the
ADA, could be interpreted to allow guardians of infants or older peo-
ple with disabilities to refuse medical treatment for their wards. Sec-
tion 35.130(e) has been revised to make it clear that paragraph (e) is
inapplicable to the concern of the commenters. A new paragraph
(e)(2) has been added stating that nothing in the regulation authorizes
the representative or guardian of an individual with a disability to
decline food, water, medical treatment, or medical services for that
individual. New paragraph (e) clarifies that neither the ADA nor the
regulation alters current Federal law ensuring the rights of incompe-
tent individuals with disabilities to receive food, water, and medical
treatment.42
The reverse is also true, as (e)(1) indicates, namely, nothing in the ADA
or the regulations alters federal law regarding the permissibility of per-
sons with disabilities to refuse medical treatment. Although the Depart-
ment of Justice does not say so, this affected body of federal law also
includes the Patient Self-Determination Act,4 3 as well as recognition of
federal constitutional liberty rights to refuse medical treatment.' A crit-
39. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler, 358 F. Supp. 2d at 1165.
40. Note, The Oregon Health Care Proposal and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 106
HARv. L. REv. 1296, 1305-08 (1993).
41. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler, 403 F.3d at 1294 ("The ADA was never intended to provide an
avenue for challenging court orders in termination of care cases.").
42. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services, 56
Fed. Reg. 35,694 (Dep't of Justice July 26, 1991).
43. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc(a) (2006).
44. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) ("We have also assumed,
and strongly suggested, that the Due Process Clause protects the traditional right to refuse
unwanted lifesaving medical treatment."); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261
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ical component of this federal corpus is that while states are permitted to
insist on clear and convincing evidence when non-treatment decisions
are made for people who have lost decisionmaking capacity, states are
not required to adopt this stringent standard.45 The ADA should not be
read to override this delicate balance of federal law with regard to refus-
als of medical treatment. What is thus half-right about the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's reason in Schiavo is that the ADA provides no general reason
beyond the possibility of disability discrimination for re-litigating state
court decisions with respect to medical decisionmaking. (What is half-
wrong is the blanket statement that the ADA never provides grounds for
challenging a non-treatment decision.) The mere presence of the ADA,
therefore, was not the basis of a claim to raise in Schiavo and hence of a
federal cause of action for the district court to have examined under the
congressional directive granting the federal courts jurisdiction over the
case.
The district court reasoned that the hospice was not acting because
of Terri Schiavo's disability (and thus not violating the ADA) since it
was simply following a state court order.4 6 This statement contains a
problematic echo of an earlier U.S. Supreme Court decision holding that
a hospital did not violate the Rehabilitation Act by following a parents'
wish to refuse lifesaving surgery for their disabled infant.47 Surely an
entity otherwise covered by the ADA (the hospice was a public accom-
modation) cannot avoid the assertion that it is acting on the basis of
disability merely by demonstrating that it is following the directions of
another party with legal authority (in this case, Michael Schiavo as
guardian) who is not covered by the ADA. The ADA must require pub-
lic accommodations engaged in providing services for people with disa-
bilities to do more than merely accept the reasons they are given by
others.
But Schiavo was not a case in which the hospice was evading
responsibility by following Michael Schiavo's instructions. Rather, the
hospice was acting in accord with a court order in a case that had been
fully litigated - and re-litigated - under state guardianship and surrogate
decisionmaking law.48 To conclude that in doing so the hospice was
acting by reason of Terri Schiavo's disability, the federal district court
would either have had to examine whether Florida guardianship law in
(1990) (assuming, for the sake of argument that there is a right of competent patients to refuse
medical treatment including nutrition and hydration, the state may insist on a clear and convincing
evidence standard when such decisions involve incompetent patients).
45. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 284 (a state "may" apply a clear and convincing evidence standard).
46. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1165 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
47. Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 630 (1986).
48. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler, 358 F. Supp. 2d at 1165.
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general conflicts with the ADA or re-litigate the issues of guardianship
law already settled in state court. To do the former would be to read the
ADA as changing the present balance of state and federal law with
respect to medical decisionmaking. To do the latter would be to re-
litigate state law issues, which is not what the congressional directive
authorized. Thus, the district court was correct in concluding that the
hospice had not violated the ADA because the ADA does not upset fully
litigated state court decisions with respect to the appointment of guardi-
ans and the making of medical treatment decisions by surrogates. It is
worth noting, however, that the district court would have been wrong
had it suggested that the hospice could evade ADA responsibility merely
because it was following directives reached elsewhere.
Bagenstos seems to contend that the ADA does provide a cause of
action to re-examine state law proceedings with respect to guardianship
and medical decisionmaking.49 If there are allegations to the effect that
the state law decisions involved discrimination against people with disa-
bilities, Bagenstos is surely right - there would be an issue of disability
discrimination to litigate separately from the guardianship decision. The
question is whether such an issue was raised in the Schiavo case.
Bagenstos characterizes the Florida court as having authorized the termi-
nation of life-sustaining treatment on the basis of Terri Schiavo's disa-
bility: "[T]hat medical condition [Terri Schiavo's impairment] was the
sole reason the state courts concluded that she would not choose to
receive further feeding and hydration. '50 But this is not exactly correct;
the state court decision was based on recommendations of the guardian
and the guardian ad litem and what the court concluded was clear and
convincing evidence of Terri Schiavo's wishes and interests regarding
her medical condition.5' For this to have been an ADA claim, there
would need to have been some assertion that these determinations were
biased by judgments about Terri Schiavo's disability, not merely that
they were judgments that involved a person with a disability. Bagenstos
appears to recognize the presence of these additional factors in the
court's decision because he further contends that ADA scrutiny would
involve examining whether subtle bias against people with disabilities
figured into the state courts' handling of the case:
To say that a state judge can insulate from review a decision to with-
hold a patient's treatment simply by deciding that the patient would
have wanted to withhold treatment begs the question. The decision
about what the patient would have wanted may well be influenced by
49. Bagenstos, supra note 17, at 457.
50. Id. at 459.
51. E.g., In re Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003, 2000 WL 34546715, at *2 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct.
Feb. 11, 2000).
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(perhaps unconscious) bias against disability. It is commonplace that
non-disabled people entertain much more negative views about the
quality and desirability of living life with a disability than do people
with disabilities themselves. If a state judge, in the course of decid-
ing what an incompetent patient "would have wanted," relies on such
biased assessments, it is reasonable to treat the judge's decision as
itself discriminatory. Such a decision calls for scrutiny under the dis-
ability discrimination laws, and a judge ought not be able to shield
his or her decision from such scrutiny simply by deeming the deci-
sion to be an exercise of the incompetent patient's choice.52
The problem in Bagenstos' argument, however, is that the Schindlers
advanced no additional reason for thinking that there had been disability
discrimination other than reiterating the assertion that Terri Schiavo was
not in PVS.53 Thus, to read the Schiavo case as disability discrimina-
tion, one must read the ADA as authorizing the federal courts to scruti-
nize state court guardianship and medical treatment decisions - that is,
to second guess the reasoning and safeguards in state law in this area.
But as we have argued, the ADA does not do this.
Moreover, as we will argue in the remainder of this Article, the
questions that continue to be raised about the resolution of the case
under Florida law rest on assumptions that are deeply problematic from
the point of view of the civil rights of people with disabilities. The
problematic nature of these assumptions suggests that it would be mis-
taken to revisit the current federal/state balance in these matters or to
revamp the ADA as a tool for so doing
III. SCHIAVO AND SCIENCE
One persistent question that has been raised about the Schiavo case
concerns Terri Schiavo's medical condition. Whether the evidence sup-
ported the conclusions that she was in PVS and had no chance for recov-
ery is an issue that was contested and re-contested by the Schindlers and
continues to be a point of advocacy among right-to-life groups. 54 The
evidence about Terri Schiavo's medical condition and prognosis was
repeatedly scrutinized by the Florida courts,55 which never reached the
conclusion that credible evidence supported the questions the Schindlers
raised.5 6
The litigation of Terri Schiavo's medical condition has a lengthy
52. Bagenstos, supra note 17, at 462-63.
53. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., Medical Affidavits, TERRI SCHINDLER SCHIAvo FOUND., http://www.terrisfight.
org/mainlinks.php?tablesingle=mainterri_story&id=7 (last visited Mar. 7, 2007).
55. See infra notes 57-69 and accompanying text. See generally cases cited supra note 2.
56. See infra notes 57-69 and accompanying text. See generally cases cited supra note 2.
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history. In 2000, ruling on Michael Schiavo's petition as guardian to
remove Terri Schiavo's feeding tube, the Florida trial court concluded
"beyond all doubt" that Terri Schiavo was in PVS.5 7 The Schindlers
filed various motions for relief from the judgment, all of which the
appellate court denied.58 After these rulings, the Schindlers filed an
amended petition for relief from the judgment, which introduced new
affidavits, including one from a physician stating that Terri Schiavo was
not in PVS, that she exhibited purposeful activity, and that new treat-
ments could improve her level of functioning.59 On this basis, the appel-
late court remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of
whether this new evidence was sufficient to establish that the decision to
terminate treatment was no longer equitable.6" As guidance, the appel-
late court instructed the trial court to order a new set of medical exami-
nations and to hear expert testimony from at least five physicians, one of
whom was new to the case, selected by the parties or appointed by the
court if they could not agree, and board certified in neurology or neuro-
surgery." During the 2001 proceedings, Terri Schiavo's feeding tube
was removed and reinserted;62 the order for new medical examinations
resulted in an indefinite stay of the order for removal of the feeding
tube.63
Finally, in November 2002, the trial court concluded that the medi-
cal evidence continued to support the conclusions that Terri Schiavo was
in PVS and had no prospects for recovery.64 Instead of producing testi-
mony from the physician who had given the affidavit on which the
Schindlers' appeal relied, the Schindlers produced evidence from two
other physicians (a radiologist and a neurologist), Michael Schiavo pro-
duced evidence from two physicians (both neurologists), and the court
appointed an additional neurologist when the parties were unable to
agree on a fifth expert.65 The trial court placed the greatest weight on its
appointed neurologist's conclusions and decided that there was no credi-
ble evidence that Terri Schiavo was not in PVS or that treatment was
57. Notice to Court Pursuant to Section 415.1055(9), F.S. and Petition/Motion for
Intervention at 6, In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Feb. 23,
2005) [hereinafter Notice to Court Pursuant to Section 415.1055(9)], available at http://www.dcf,
state.fl.us/news/petition.pdf.
58. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 792 So.2d 551, 560 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001); In re
Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
59. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 800 So. 2d 640, 644 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
60. Id. at 645.
61. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182, 184 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
62. Cerminara & Goodman, supra note 18.
63. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 800 So. 2d at 640.
64. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GB-003, 2002 WL 31817960 (Fla. 6th Cir.
Ct. Nov. 22, 2002).
65. Id. at *1-2, *5.
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available that held the prospect of improving her condition.66 The court
consequently denied the petition for relief from the judgment, and the
Schindlers appealed.67 In June 2003, the appellate court concluded that
the trial court's determination was not an abuse of discretion.68 Further-
more - and despite its procedural role as an appellate court that does not
review evidence de novo - the court stated that it would have reached
the same evidentiary conclusion as the trial court had made.6 9
In October 2003, the proceedings again reached a breaking point
when Terri Schiavo's feeding tube was removed.7" After intervention
by the Florida legislature, then-Florida Governor Jeb Bush ordered
replacement of the tube. 7' The court then appointed Jay Wolfson as a
new guardian ad litem to re-examine the case.72 Wolfson's December
2003 report to Governor Bush reaffirmed the courts' conclusions regard-
ing Terri Schiavo's medical condition. 3 One of the most contentious
medical questions involved the advisability of "swallowing tests" to
ascertain whether Terri Schiavo had the capacity to take nutrition orally,
an ability not generally possessed by patients in PVS.7' Regarding the
Schindlers' amenability to the performance of such tests, Wolfson's
report indicated that the swallowing tests would be desirable if the par-
ties could agree in advance about how the test results might be used.75
In response to the report, Governor Bush reaffirmed his commitment to
protecting Terri Schiavo's right to life and encouraged performance of
the swallowing tests and continued therapy.76 Agreement never ensued,
and the swallowing tests were not conducted.77 One of the experts in the
case - Dr. Ronald Cranford, who testified on behalf of Michael Schiavo
- has maintained that the swallowing tests were not medically indicated
66. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 851 So. 2d at 185.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 186.
69. Id.
70. See Cerminara & Goodman, supra note 18 (Judge Greer ordered feeding tube to be
removed October 15, 2003).
71. Id. (Bush issued executive order directing reinsertion of feeding tube and appointing a
guardian ad litem for Terri Schiavo).
72. Id. (Dr. Jay Wolfson appointed as new guardian ad liten for Terri Schiavo).
73. JAY WOLFSON, A REPORT TO GOVERNOR JEB BUSH AND THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN
THE MATTER OF THERESA MARIE SCHIAVo 34 (2003), available at http://abstractappeal.com/
schiavo/WolfsonReport.pdf.
74. James L. Bernat & H. Richard Beresford, The Controversy over Artificial Nutrition and
Hydration, 66 NEUROLOGY 1618 (2006).
75. WOLFSON, supra note 73, at 36-38.
76. Press Release, Florida Governor's Office, Statement by Governor Jeb Bush [Regarding)
Guardian ad Litem's Report (Dec. 2, 2003), available at http://sun6.dms.state.fl.us/eog-new/eog/
library/releases/2003/December/litems-report 12-2-03.html.
77. Jay Wolfson, The Rule in Terri's Case: An Essay on the Public Death of Theresa Marie
Schiavo, 35 SmTSON L. REV. 39, 45-46 (2005).
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because, although people in PVS can occasionally be trained to swallow,
this training increases the risk of aspiration pneumonia and is thus not
appropriate medical management for these patients. 78 Neurologists ques-
tion whether tube feeding reduces the risk of aspiration pneumonia
among patients with severe cognitive losses, although this issue remains
controversial.79
During Terri Schiavo's final days, those opposed to the feeding
tube's removal again challenged the determination that she was in
PVS.80 At Governor Bush's direction, the Florida Department of Chil-
dren and Families petitioned to intervene in the proceedings. 8 The
request to intervene was based on an affidavit by Dr. William Cheshire,
a neurologist at the Mayo Clinic, who, despite the fact that he had never
examined Terni Schiavo before rendering his affidavit, opined that she
was not, in fact, in PVS.82 In addition, the Schindlers filed a last-ditch
petition maintaining that Terri Schiavo was responsive, communicated
with her mother, and was capable of learning to speak.83
During the congressional debates, Senator Frist opined that Terri
Schiavo was not in PVS and could improve.84 He based his opinion on
court affidavits and video clips85 which once played widely on televi-
sion across the country and are still available on the Internet.86 Senator
Frist's efforts at diagnosis without examination were met with wide-
spread criticism.87 Additional opponents of the removal of Terri Schi-
avo's feeding tube included advocates of right-to-life positions who
maintained, before and after her death, that she was not in PVS.88
78. Ronald Cranford, Facts, Lies and Videotapes: The Permanent Vegetative State and the
Sad Case of Terri Schiavo, 33 J.L. MED. & ETmICS 363, 368 (2005).
79. See, e.g., Bernat & Beresford, supra note 74, at 1618-19; Ronni Chemoff, Tube Feeding
Patients with Dementia, 21 NuTR. CLIN. PRACTICE 142 (2006); Ina Li, Feeding Tubes in Patients
with Severe Dementia, 65 AM. FAMILY PHYSICIAN 1605 (2002), available at http://www.aafp.org/
afp/20020415/1605.html.
80. Maya Bell & Ethan Horowitz, Schiavo 's Feeding Tube Pulled, but Fight Goes On: Brain-
Damaged Woman's Fate Is Uncertain, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 19, 2005, at IA.
81. Notice to Court Pursuant to Section 415.1055(9), supra note 57, at 3.
82. Id.
83. Emergency Application for Stay of Enforcement of the Judgment Below Pending the
Filing and Disposition of a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeal of the
United States for the Eleventh Circuit at 25, Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 544 U.S. 957
(2005) (No. 04A844).
84. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Drawing Some Criticism, Legislators with Medical Degrees Offer
Opinions on Schiavo Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2005, at A14.
85. Lawrence M. Krauss, When Sentiment and Fear Trump Reason and Reality, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 29, 2005, at F4; Stolberg, supra note 84.
86. See Terri Schiavo Has Died, CNN.coM, Mar. 31, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/
03/3 1/schiavo/index.html.
87. E.g., George Annas, "I Want to Live": Medicine Betrayed by Ideology in the Political
Debate over Terri Schiavo, 35 STETSON L. REv. 49, 58 (2005).
88. Here is a typical example:
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Following Terri Schiavo's death, the autopsy report confirmed the
diagnosis of PVS with significant global brain tissue atrophy consistent
with the clinical diagnosis of PVS.89 The report revealed "marked
global anoxic-ischemic encephalopathy resulting in massive cerebral
atrophy"9 and brain weight of 615 grams (less than half the expected
weight). 9 ' By comparison, the weight of Karen Anne Quinlan's brain
was 835 grams.92 Neuropathological and anatomic findings, together
with medical records, indicated that Terri Schiavo would not have been
able to consume sufficient sustenance by mouth.9 3 Further, hypoxic
damage in the occipital lobes indicated cortical blindness;94 Terri Schi-
avo's inability to process visual images thus put to rest any claims by the
Schindler family that she tracked their movements and expressions visu-
ally. Finally, the autopsy report also put another claim to rest: because
of the implanted thalamic stimulator, MRI exams (requested by the
Schindlers to reevaluate Terri Schiavo's diagnosis) would have been
medically contraindicated.95
Despite the autopsy report, the Schindlers continued to portray
Terri Schiavo as though she were not in PVS. For example, in early
2006, their Web site read,
[o]ur family stands by its strong belief that Terri was not in PVS, and
we appreciate the many noted neurologists, including Dr. Cheshire
who saw Terri just weeks before she died, who agree with our posi-
tion. We also thank the brave men and women in public office in
Florida and Washington, D.C. who nobly stood on the side of life
What you find when you examine the medical data and listen to the experiences of
those who have spent the most time with Terri over the last decade is that a great
deal of evidence belies the contention that Terri is in a PVS. Terri's parents,
brother, sister, and numerous other family members and friends who visit her
regularly do not believe for a moment that Terri is unaware of her environment or
unresponsive. At a press conference organized by the Schindlers on October 24,
Terri's mother, father, and eight others all gave accounts of how they see Terri
consistently respond to people: She smiles, frowns, or acts sullenly depending on
who the person is and what he or she does or says. She reacts quite markedly to
music, particularly piano music, which she always especially enjoyed. A certified
speech therapist asserted that Terri does attempt to verbalize and has been heard
saying "yes," "no," "Mommy," and possibly even "Help me."
Robert Johansen, Killing Terri Schiavo, CRISIS MAG., Jan. 8, 2004, http://www.crisismagazine.
com/january2004/j ohansen.htm.
89. JON R. THOGMARTIN, DIST. SIx MED. EXAM'R OFFICE, REPORT OF AUTOPSY FOR THERESA
SCHIAVO (2005), available at http://www6.miami.edu/ethics/schiavo/pdf-files/O61505-autopsy.
pdf.
90. Id. at 16
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 34.
94. Id. at 35.
95. Id. at 20.
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regardless of one's disability. While their valiant efforts were not
able to ultimately save Terri, our family is forever grateful to them
for their compassion and for their conviction to do the right thing.96
Responding specifically to the autopsy report, they wrote: "We all knew
Terri was seriously brain-injured before the IME report. This is nothing
new. The IME's report also confirms that TERRI WAS NOT TERMI-
NAL. THAT TERRI HAD NO LIVING WILL, THAT TERRI HAD A
STRONG HEART, and THAT TERRI WAS BRUTALLY DEHY-
DRATED TO DEATH." 97 Much of what the Schindlers have said
regarding the autopsy report, such as the observation that Terri Schiavo
had a strong heart, is simply irrelevant to the diagnosis of PVS. Most
importantly, responses to the autopsy report, such as the one quoted
above, indicated either obfuscation of the scientific point or disbelief of
science itself.98
Disbelief of science is neither new nor unusual in American public
life.99 But it is not good for people with disabilities. Misdiagnoses and
recommendations for treatment based on bad science, medical quackery,
or outright fraud are not helpful to people with disabilities. In the Schi-
avo case, for example, the request for MRI scans to reconsider the diag-
nosis of PVS was contraindicated by the implanted thalamic
stimulator."° Strategies to encourage oral feeding risked aspiration
pneumonia.'' The Schindlers' based their efforts to re-litigate the state
court decisions on these problematic scientific assumptions. Senator
Frist likewise encouraged congressional intervention based on his opin-
ion that Terri Schiavo was not in PVS. °2 It would not serve the inter-
ests of people with disabilities if the ADA were interpreted - or
amended - to require courts to treat such pseudo-science on a par with
qualified expert testimony and appropriate medical examination.
This is not to say that science has always served people with disa-
bilities well. There is a long and regrettable history of scientific dis-
crimination against people with disabilities, °3 which gives the disabled
96. Press Release, Schindler Family, Schindler Family Statement on Medical Examiner's
Report (June 16, 2005), available at http://joumalsalnotquaida54.blogspot.com/2005_06 01
joumalsalnotquaida54_archive.html.
97. Id.
98. Cranford, supra note 78, at 370 (Schinders were "terribly mistaken and ill informed"
about Terri Schiavo's true medical condition).
99. See, e.g., CHRIS MOONEY, THE REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE 14-24 (2005).
100. See Cranford, supra note 78, at 364-66.
101. WOLFSON, supra note 73, at 27-28; Cranford, supra note 78, at 368; see also Thomas E.
Finucane & Colleen Christmas, Aspiration Pneumonia Letter 002, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1868
(2001).
102. Stolberg, supra note 84.
103. See generally DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS (1995).
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good reason to be suspicious of science and of policy in the name of
science. Put bluntly, "eugenics" for a time cloaked itself as a science to
press for the legitimization of the elimination of people with disabili-
ties."°4 The Nazi program of killing people with disabilities was the
worst of these practices. 0 5 Eugenics even has an extensive role in
American law: Buck v. Bell, a case in which a disposition to reproduce
out of wedlock was deemed as stemming from an inheritable disability
and in which Justice Holmes made the infamous comment that "three
generations of imbeciles are enough,"106 has not been overruled to this
day despite the state of Virginia's own resolution of regret. 0 7 Eugenics
has also played an important role in American science; Cold Spring Har-
bor, historically and to this day a major center for genetics research and
education,10 8 was the location of the Eugenics Records Office.' ° 9 At
present, efforts to allow parents to use prenatal genetic diagnosis and
selective abortion for disability are also highly controversial." 1 The
idea that diagnosis of a fetus with Down Syndrome is a "medical indica-
tion" for abortion, for example, confuses empirical judgments about the
chromosomal makeup of the fetus with other likely empirical judgments
about the fetus (such as the likelihood of anomalies like heart defects
associated with Down Syndrome) and the parents' judgments made on
non-medical grounds about whether they want to carry the fetus to
term." I
Science also has been associated with the "medicalization" of disa-
bility - the idea that disability is always and only about "mis"-fitting
104. See id. at 97-128.
105. For overviews of Nazi eugenics, see generally CTR. FOR BIOMED. ETHICS, UNIV. MINN.,
WHEN MEDICINE WENT MAD: BIOETHICS AND THE HOLOCAUST (Arthur L. Caplan ed., 1992), and
ROBERT JAY Lin'rON, THE NAZI DOCTORS: MEDICAL KILLING AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GENOCIDE
(1986).
106. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
107. See Paul A. Lombardo, Taking Eugenics Seriously: Three Generations of ??? are
Enough?, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 191, 196 (2003).
108. Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, http://www.cshl.edu (last visited Jan. 17, 2007).
109. Janet L. Dolgin, Personhood, Discrimination, and the New Genetics, 66 BROOK. L. REV.
755, 766 n.67 (2001); Edward J. Larson, The Meaning of Human Gene Testing for Disability
Rights, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 913, 915 (2002).
110. See generally Adrienne Asch, Disability Equality and Prenatal Testing: Contradictory or
Compatible?, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 315 (2003); Peter Chipman, The Moral Implications of
Prenatal Genetic Testing, 2 PENN. BIOETHICS J. 13 (2006), available at http:llwww.
bioethicsjoumal.com/pdf/pbj2.2_chipman.pdf; A.E. Raz, Disability Rights, Prenatal Diagnosis
and Eugenics: A Cross-Cultural View, 14 J. GENETIC COUNSELING 183 (2005); Christy Roberts,
The Role of Genetic Counseling in the Elective Termination of Pregnancies Involving Fetuses with
Disabilities, 36 J. SPEC. EDUC. 48 (2002).
111. See Cara Dunne & Catherine Warren, Lethal Autonomy: The Malfunction of the Informed
Consent Mechanism Within the Context of Prenatal Diagnosis of Genetic Variants, 14 ISSUES L.
& MED. 165, 168 (1998); Larson, supra note 109, at 922-24; Lombardo, supra note 107, at 217-
18.
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bodies and not about misfits between bodies and world design."t2 The
locomotive difficulties faced by someone with a mobility impairment
are at least as much a function of how we have designed our streets,
public transportation, and building thresholds - some features of which
date back centuries - as they are of how bodies are shaped. I I3 To place
the onus of change on "correcting" bodies is at least in part to put it in
the wrong place. The confusion of scientific judgments with notions of
appropriate world design has fed these misconceptions." 4
These problems with science and the use of science are very real
and cannot be ignored. But, these problems are far from showing that
there is no difference between science and pseudo-science of the types at
issue in Schiavo: disbelief of medical imaging, selective videotape edit-
ing, and untested therapies such as hyperbaric oxygen chambers.' ' Nor
do these problems show that it would be a good thing for people with
disabilities to make judgments on the basis of inaccurate information or
information limited by refusals to learn what is knowable about a per-
son's physical condition. We must, of course, guard against confusing
science with policy and against using science for improper objectives.
Further, we must be especially vigilant in the area of disability policy,
given the lamentable history of science in this arena. Yet, it does not
follow from this that we should ignore science; rather, we should instead
use it wisely.
The Florida courts scrutinized and re-scrutinized the evidence about
Terri Schiavo's medical condition.116 The Schindlers' claims that Terri
Schiavo was not in PVS or that treatments were available to improve her
condition were based on inaccurate science." 7 Thus, science provides
no argument that the Florida courts missed anything in Schiavo. Indeed,
the reverse is true: the Florida courts permitted the Schindlers to pro-
pound numerous affidavits from physicians who made claims that sim-
ply could not be supported scientifically.118 Schiavo is not, therefore, an
illustration of state courts failing to scrutinize science carefully. Sug-
gesting that the case does reflect such a failure itself rests on bad sci-
ence. Schiavo is also not a case that would suggest reassessing whether
112. See A. SILVERS, D. WASSERMAN & M. MAHOWALD, DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE,
DISCRIMINATION (1998).
113. See id.
114. See, e.g., Ron Amundson, Biological Normality and the ADA, in AMERICANS wITH
DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 102-111
(Anita Silvers & Leslie Francis eds., 2000); SILVERS, WASSERMAN & MAIOWALD, supra note
112, at 1, 129-131.
115. See generally Cranford, supra note 78.
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federal anti-discrimination law should be available as a corrective to
state law in this arena.
IV. THE SCHIAVO CASE IN THE LAW:
GUARDIANSHIP, SURROGACY, AND MEDICAL
TREATMENT DECISIONS
Another set of deeply contested issues in the Schiavo case con-
cerned guardianship and medical treatment decisions. Some of these
issues were particular to the case - such as whether Michael Schiavo's
continued appointment as guardian was appropriate - but others reached
more generally to Florida guardianship and surrogacy law. The Schin-
dlers maintained that Michael Schiavo had conflicts of interest, was not
acting in Terri Schiavo's best interest, and should have been removed as
guardian.11 9 With respect to Florida law more generally, arguments
have been advanced that it allows too much leeway for surrogates to
authorize termination of treatment decisions in making decisions for
incompetent people. ' 20
Florida law authorizes courts to appoint guardians for people who
lack capacity and allows guardianship designations to be either limited
or plenary. 2' Florida law is protective of the civil rights of people with
cognitive impairments and thus favors limited guardianship appoint-
ments whenever possible. 2 2 Competent people may name "preneed"
guardians to serve in case of incapacity,1 23 but courts are not required to
follow the statutory presumption that favors such designations if there
are clear conflicts of interest 124 or questions of the preneed guardian's
qualifications. 25  Florida also has a Statewide Public Guardianship
Office that can accept appointments if no family members, friends,
banks, corporations, or others are available to serve. 126 Appointment of
a guardian for an incapacitated adult is not required; moreover, if the
adult has made effective other arrangements such as the creation of a
durable power of attorney, such power may survive the incompetency of
the principal. 127 Florida law also provides for the appointment of a
119. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 179-80 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2001).
120. Posting of Elizabeth Price Foley to Blogs for Terri, http://www.blogsforterfi.com/
archives/2005/03/savingjterri-sc.php (Mar. 4, 2005, 9:23 EST).
121. §§ 744.102(9)(a)-(b), FLA. STAT. (2006).
122. § 744.1012, FLA. STAT. (2006).
123. § 744.3045(1), FLA. STAT. (2006).
124. Davis v. King, 686 So. 2d 763, 764-65 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
125. Butler v. Peacock, 898 So. 2d 1139, 1141 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
126. § 744.702, FLA. STAT. (2006).
127. Smith v. Lynch, 821 So. 2d 1197, 1199 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002). On January 1,
2007, § 744.331 was amended to provide that an attorney seeking to be appointed by a court for
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guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the ward in particular legal
proceedings.' 28 Furthermore, in 2006, the Florida legislature added a
provision to guardianship law permitting courts to appoint emergency
monitors in cases of apparent immediate danger to the physical or
mental health, or property, of a ward.
129
Under Florida's guardianship law, the court appointed guardian is
directed to give preference to people "related by blood or marriage" to
the ward 130 and to consider the ward's preferences, if they have been
expressed.' 3 ' A person is disqualified from serving as a guardian by
continuing business relationships, employment with an entity providing
services to the ward, or "any other circumstance in which a conflict of
interest may occur."'13 2  If a conflict of interest occurs between the
guardian and the ward, a guardian ad litem must be appointed to
represent the ward's interests and to petition the court for the guardian's
removal.' 33 Among other rights, incapacitated persons have the right to
be free of neglect and abuse and to receive necessary services and reha-
bilitation.' 34 Relatedly, guardians have the duty to act in the best inter-
est of their wards, particularly as evidenced by the fact that interested
parties may petition the court if it appears that the guardian is not acting
in the ward's best interest.1 35 Guardians may be removed for failure to
perform their duties, abuse of their powers, or conflicts of interest.
36
Florida's current advance directive law was adopted in 1992 and
amended most significantly in 1999.137 The law permits both the desig-
incapacity and guardianship proceedings must have completed a minimum of eight hours of
education in guardianship. § 744.331(2)(d), FLA. STAT. (2007).
128. § 744.102(9), FLA. STAT. (2006).
129. § 744.1075(1)(a), FLA. STAT. (2006).
130. § 744.312(2)(a), FLA. STAT. (2006).
131. § 744.312(3)(a).
132. § 744.309(3), FLA. STAT. (2006). Interestingly enough, the statute permits the conflict of
interest to be overridden when the proposed guardian is a family member employed by an entity
providing services to the ward, the conflict is minimal, and the appointment is clearly in the best
interest of the ward. The statute does not provide for other conflicts of interest to be overridden in
such circumstances. § 744.309(1).
133. § 744.391, FLA. STAT. (2006).
134. § 744.3215(1), FLA. STAT. (2006). A 2006 amendment added "necessary to maximize the
quality of the person's life." H.B. 457, 108th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006), available at http:ll
www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?FileName=_H0457er.doc&Docu
mentType=Bill&BillNumber=0457&Session=2006.
135. § 744.3715(1), FLA. STAT. (2006).
136. §§ 744.474(2), (3), (11), FLA. STAT. (2006).
137. For a review of the Florida decisions and legislative debates leading to the passage of
Florida's advance directive law in 1992, see Meta Calder, Chapter 765 Revisited: Florida's New
Advance Directive Law, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 291 (1992). For a discussion of the 1999
amendments, see Alison Cossetti, End of Life Care in Florida: Should the Law Follow the
Lobbyists or the People's Wishes?, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 13, 19-28 (2001).
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nation of healthcare surrogates 13 8 and the creation of living wills.
139
Living wills are applicable if the patient is terminally ill, in an end stage
condition, or in PVS.' 40 "End stage condition," added in 1999, is
defined as "an irreversible condition that is caused by injury, disease, or
illness which has resulted in progressively severe and permanent deteri-
oration, and which, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, treat-
ment of the condition would be ineffective."'' In the absence of a
living will, designated surrogates may make decisions to withhold or
withdraw life-sustaining treatment if the patient meets one of these con-
ditions. 4 ' If the patient has not designated a surrogate, the statute
authorizes healthcare decisions to be made by proxies in the following
order: guardian, spouse, adult child (or majority of same reasonably
available for consultation), parent, adult sibling (or majority of same rea-
sonably available for consultation), followed by other caring relatives,
close friends, or a clinical social worker selected by the facility in which
the patient is living. 4 3 The terminology here is useful: "surrogates" are
decisionmakers chosen by the person, and "proxies" are decisionmakers
chosen by the operation of law. "I
Florida's default proxy list is noteworthy in several respects in rela-
tion to the identity of the disputing parties in Schiavo. First, it adopts
the common view that spouses come before parents and parents before
siblings.'45 Second, it limits the involvement of "other" relatives to
those who have exhibited special care and concern for the patient.1
46
Third, it extends beyond the family to close friends.14 7 Finally, it autho-
rizes the selection of proxies for those who have no one - the
"unbefriended." 48 Concerns that may guide these statutory provisions
include ensuring that everyone is covered (perhaps a special problem in
a state with a large elderly population that has either outlived family and
138. § 765.202, FLA. STAT. (2006). A written designation of a surrogate creates a rebuttable
presumption of clear and convincing evidence of the principal's selection of the surrogate.
§ 765.202(7).
139. § 765.302(1), FLA. STAT. (2006). Living wills create rebuttable presumptions of clear and
convincing evidence of the principal's wishes. § 765.302(3). Disputes are subject to expedited
review under § 765.105, FLA. STAT. (2006)
140. § 765.302(1).
141. § 765.101(4), FLA. STAT. (2006).
142. § 765.305(1), FLA. STAT. (2006).
143. § 765.401(1), FLA. STAT. (2006).
144. §765.101(15)-(16).
145. UNIv. HEALTH-CARE DEcIsIONs ACT §5(b), 9(1B) U.L.A. 111 (1993).
146. For a discussion of the role of families as default proxies, see Leslie P. Francis, The Role
of the Family in Health Care Decisionmaking, 1992 UTAH L. REv. 861.
147. § 765.401(l)(g).
148. For a discussion of the term "unbefriended," see PAMELA B. TEASTER ET AL., WARDS OF
THE STATE: A NATIONAL STUDY OF PUBLIC GUARDIANSHIP (2005), available at http://www.
abanet.org/aging/publications/docs/wardofstatefinal.pdf.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
friends or is geographically distant from family and friends) and select-
ing those who may be especially caring and knowledgeable about the
patient
Default proxies have the same duties as the person's designated
surrogate with one important qualification: any decision a proxy makes
to terminate life-sustaining treatment must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence either that the decision is what the ward would
have made or is in the person's best interest.'49 Florida's advance direc-
tive law is an addition to patients' rights at common law and specifically
does not alter these rights.' 50 In a case antedating the adoption of Flor-
ida's current statute in 1992, the Florida Supreme Court held that com-
petent patients have the constitutional right to refuse medical treatment,
that this right extends to patients after they lose competence and may be
exercised by proxies on their behalf, and that the clear and convincing
evidence standard applies to such proxy decisions.'
5 '
Two other aspects of Florida's guardianship and advance directive
law are especially relevant to the Schiavo litigation. One is the provi-
sion that permits any interested person - including family members,
healthcare providers, or anyone directly affected by a termination of
treatment decision - to seek expedited judicial intervention. 52 This
intervention must be based on the belief that the decision is not in accord
with the patient's known wishes, the advance directive is ambiguous or
the patient's views have changed, the surrogate or proxy was improperly
designated, or the surrogate or proxy is not discharging his duties or has
abused his powers.' 53 The second is the requirement that a court, when
appointing a new guardian, must ascertain whether the ward has a valid
advance directive for healthcare when appointing a guardian. 154 The
court must specify what authority the guardian has over the healthcare
surrogate'55 and may limit the authority of the surrogate on the grounds
provided in the surrogacy statute. 1
56
Part of what made the Schiavo litigation difficult from the begin-
ning was the fact that Terri Schiavo had not executed any of the instru-
ments available under Florida law to designate a preferred
decisionmaker or to direct her management - medical or otherwise - in
149. § 765.401(3).
150. § 765.106, FLA. STAT. (2006).
151. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 11-17 (Fla. 1990).
152. § 744.3715(1), FLA. STAT. (2006).
153. § 765.105, FLA. STAT. (2006).
154. Id.
155. § 744.3115, FLA. STAT. (2006).
156. § 765.105.
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case of incapacity. 5 7 This was not surprising because Tern Schiavo
was a young adult who was happily married and surrounded by a loving
family. Schiavo thus involved issues about guardianship and proxy
decisionmaking, but did not include the involvement of a designated
surrogate.
Shortly after Tern Schiavo's cardiac arrest in 1990, Michael Schi-
avo was appointed her guardian without contest. 58  Under Florida's
proxy consent statute, he thus had priority over her parents, as both her
guardian and her spouse.'59 In 1993, the Schindlers made their first
effort to have him removed as guardian; John Pecarik was appointed
guardian ad litem to represent Tern Schiavo's interest in the proceed-
ings. 60 After Pecarik reported that Michael Schiavo had acted appropri-
ately and attentively, the court denied the Schindlers' petition.' 6 ' In
1998, after Michael Schiavo petitioned for removal of the feeding tube,
the court again appointed a guardian ad litem, Richard Pearse.162
Pearse's report concluded that Tern Schiavo was in PVS and had no
prospect of recovery, that both Michael Schiavo and the Schindlers had
potential conflicts of interest, and that a guardian ad litem should con-
tinue to represent Tern Scbiavo's interests in any subsequent legal pro-
ceeding. 63 Pearse further reported that Michael Schiavo's claims about
his wife's wishes about life-sustaining treatment would have to meet
Florida's clear and convincing evidence standard in order for the feeding
tube's removal to be legally authorized.' 4 In the eventual trial in 2000,
the court agreed with the guardian ad litem that both Michael Schiavo
and the Schindlers had conflicts of interest; 165 however, the court con-
cluded that the decision to remove the feeding tube was supported by
clear and convincing evidence based on testimony from several other
credible witnesses.
166
After this ruling, the Schindlers sought to produce new evidence to
demonstrate that Michael Schiavo's testimony about Tern Schiavo's
157. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
158. Cerminara & Goodman, supra note 18.
159. § 765.401(1), FLA. STAT. (2006).
160. Cerminara & Goodman, supra note 18.
161. Id.
162. Id. (Michael Schiavo petitioned the court to authorize the feeding tube's removal, the
Schindlers opposed on grounds that Terri Schiavo would want to remain alive, and the court
appointed Richard Pearse, Esq., as second guardian ad litem).
163. Report of Guardian ad Litem Richard L. Pearse, Jr., at 2, 13, In re Guardianship of
Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Dec. 29, 1998), available at http://www6.miami.
edu/ethics/schiavo/pdffiles/122998_SchiavoRichardPearseGALreport.pdf.
164. Id. at 11.
165. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003, 2000 WL 34546715, at *2 (Fla. 6th
Cir. Ct. Feb. 11, 2000).
166. Id.
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wishes was perjured. 67 The Florida appellate court ruled that this testi-
mony should be heard within the original guardianship proceedings and
directed the trial court to reopen the proceedings and consider this evi-
dence.168 The appellate court further cautioned the Schindlers that they
must offer new evidence that made continued enforcement of the trial
court's initial order inequitable. 69 The appellate court also made clear
that it regarded the conclusion that clear and convincing evidence sup-
ported removal of the feeding tube as entirely within the discretion of
the trial court.1 70 The trial judge subsequently concluded that the Schin-
dlers had not produced new evidence that supported Michael Schiavo's
removal as guardian, and the appellate court affirmed this ruling.' 7' The
appellate court's affirmance did not end the proceedings, however,
because the appellate court remanded the case to the trial judge for con-
sideration of affidavits with respect to Terri Schiavo's medical condi-
tion.' 72 The Schindlers also continued to seek to have the court remove
Michael Schiavo as guardian on multiple grounds.' 73
After the Schindlers' various petitions were denied, and the feeding
tube was removed in fall 2003, the Florida legislature intervened and
directed appointment of a new guardian ad litem in the case. 174 The
court appointed Jay Wolfson, a professor at the College of Public Health
at the University of South Florida. 175  Wolfson's report, issued in
December 2003, recommended appointment of an ongoing guardian ad
litem in light of the controversial nature of the case. 176 The report con-
cluded that the court determinations about Terri Schiavo's condition,
prognosis, and wishes were "firmly grounded" in Florida law and satis-
fied the clear and convincing evidence standard. 177
In comparison to the evidence concerning Terri Schiavo's medical
condition and prognosis, Michael Schiavo's continued service as guard-
ian was not an easy question. The reasons advanced by the Schindlers
for his removal - his new relationship and his possible financial bene-
167. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 792 So. 2d 551, 555-56 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 561.
170. Id.
171. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 800 So. 2d 640, 643 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
172. Id. at 645.
173. Petition to Remove Guardian and to Appoint Successor Guardian, In re Guardianship of
Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Nov. 15, 2002), available at http://www6.miami.
edu/ethics/schiavo/Nov_22_2002_Petitionto_removeMS as-guardian.html.
174. H.B. 35-E, 105th Leg., Sess. E § 3 (Fla. 2003), available at http://www.myfloridahouse.
gov/Sections/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?FileName=_H0035Ee1 .doc&DocumentType=Bill&BilI
Number=0035E&Session=2003E.
175. See Cerminara & Goodman, supra note 18.
176. WOLFSON, supra note 73, at 3.
177. Id. at 34.
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fit 78 - are factors of the type that give pause about a guardian's service.
The Schindlers, however, had similar conflicts: If Michael Schiavo
stood to gain financially under some resolutions, so did they.' 79 And if
Michael Schiavo had new family commitments, the Schindlers had ideo-
logical commitments that were equally firm. The Florida courts scruti-
nized and re-scrutinized these issues under Florida guardianship law,
with the appointment of three different guardians ad litem to provide
independent representation of the interests of the ward. None concluded
that Michael Schiavo had a conflict of interest that warranted his
removal as guardian. 80 One did find that Michael Schiavo's testimony
by itself was not clear and convincing evidence of Terri Schiavo's
wishes, but even that report recommended removing the feeding tube if
the court found that the clear and convincing evidence standard was
met. 
1 8'
Nor was the determination of Terri Schiavo's wishes an easy ques-
tion. As is common in these cases, there were no direct, prospective
statements regarding her treatment preferences in the case's exact cir-
cumstances. 82 There were, instead, a variety of reported statements, to
a variety of people, in a variety of contexts. 83 The effort to retroac-
tively determine Terri Schiavo's wishes for her resulting circumstances
is, therefore, at best a reconstructive enterprise, relying not only on her
statements, but also on evidence about what she enjoyed doing, what
choices she made, and what values she held, to mention some of the
more important factors in this reconstruction. This is the "substituted
judgment" standard - at best a reconstruction by others and not the aug-
mented voice of a person who can no longer speak directly for
herself. ' 84
Although the Schindlers claimed that these third party statements
were hearsay - apparently on the general rubric that reports of state-
ments are hearsay if offered to prove the claim made in the statement
(although not hearsay if offered to prove that the statement was made) -
Florida recognizes the exception to the hearsay rule that statements are
not hearsay if offered as proof of the psychological state of their
178. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
179. See Report of Guardian ad Litem Richard L. Pearse, Jr., supra note 163, at 8.
180. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003, 2000 WL 34546715, at *2 (Fla. 6th
Cir. Ct. Feb. 11, 2000) (first guardian ad litem report); Report of Guardian ad Litem Richard L.
Pearse, Jr., supra note 163 (second guardian ad litem report); WOLFSON, supra note 73 (third
guardian ad litem report).
181. Report of Guardian ad Litem Richard L. Pearse, Jr., supra note 163, at 13.
182. Id. at 11.
183. Id. at 11-13; In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 2000 WL 34546715, at *3-6.
184. See, e.g., Leslie P. Francis, Decisionmaking at the End of Life: Patients with Alzheimer's
or Other Dementias, 35 GA. L. REv. 539, 563 (2001).
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maker. 85 Thus, these statements are part of the evidence that may be
considered - along with evidence about what she did, her frequency of
church attendance, or the amount of time she spent with her husband or
her parents, for example - in a reconstruction of what Terri Schiavo
would decide at the time of her treatment if she had the ability to speak
for herself. For their part, the Schindlers produced evidence touching
some of these points, including testimony on the amount of time Terri
Schiavo spent with her mother and her mother's testimony about her
marriage."' The Schindlers failed to proffer other kinds of evidence -
like church attendance, for example. Given all of their efforts to con-
vince the court that Terri Schiavo would not have wanted life-sustaining
treatment withdrawn and the relevance of active Catholic faith to the
controversy, it seems reasonable to assume that they may not have had
further evidence of this kind at the time.
When a proxy makes a decision to terminate life-sustaining medical
treatment for an incapacitated person, Florida law requires clear and
convincing evidence of either the wishes or the best interest of the
patient. 87 Whether the evidence meets this clear and convincing evi-
dence standard is frequently a troublesome question, much like the stan-
dard itself,'88  and Schiavo certainly was not an exception.
Commentators have disagreed on whether the Florida courts applied
their standard properly in ascertaining Terri Schiavo's wishes about life-
sustaining treatment. 8 9 Commentators have also argued that the court's
inquiry should have been broadened beyond evidence about her state-
ments - her hopes with her husband to have a child, the quality of her
marriage, and the amount of time she spent with her parents - to evi-
dence about other matters such as her wishes concerning the identifica-
tion of a proxy decisionmaker. 9 The fact remains, however, that the
185. See § 90.803(3)(a)(1), FLA. STAT. (2006); see also In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1230 n.6
(N.J. 1985) ("[O]ral and written expressions of a person's reactions or desires fit within the
'existing state of mind' exception to the hearsay rule." (citations omitted)).
186. Report of Guardian ad Litem Richard L. Pearse, Jr., supra note 163, at 6.
187. See § 765.401(3), FLA. STAT. (2006).
188. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Schiavo and Its (In)Significance, 35 STETSON L. REv. 101,
115 (2005).
189. See Maura A. Flood, Treatment of the "Vegetative" Patient: The Legacies of Karen
Quinlan, Nancy Cruzan, and Terri Schiavo, 1 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 1, 33-46 (2005) (arguing
that the clear and convincing evidence standard was met in Schiavo); 0. Carter Snead, The
(Surprising) Truth About Schiavo: A Defeat for the Cause of Autonomy, 22 CONST. COMMENT.
383, 400-01 (2005) (arguing that the clear and convincing evidence standard was not met in
Schiavo).
190. Robert A. Burt, Family Conflict and Family Privacy: The Constitutional Violation in
Terri Schiavo's Death, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 427, 447 (2005). For a discussion of legislative
efforts to pursue this possibility in Ohio, see Lois Shepherd, Terri Schiavo: Unsettling the Settled,
37 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 297, 318-19 (2006).
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courts examined and reexamined evidence about her medical condition,
about her statements and her life, and about what her various guardians
ad litem had reported. 1
The process in Schiavo involved Florida law and Florida courts
making the most careful judgments they could about guardianship and
medical treatment for an incapacitated person. The courts applied Flor-
ida guardianship law and Florida law about the substantive and eviden-
tiary standards for the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. 92 To
allow continual challenges to such processes, even after they were
brought to careful conclusion, would be to introduce ongoing instability
into the guardianship and medical decisionmaking processes. This insta-
bility would not be positive for people with disabilities, whose best
interest requires resolute, yet carefully scrutinized, decisionmaking.
Otherwise, there would be no stability about decisions to continue or to
withhold treatment; findings to continue treatment on the basis of substi-
tuted judgment would be as subject to ongoing challenge as the actual
findings in Schiavo.
To conclude that the guardianship issues in Schiavo should have
been re-litigated under the ADA because Terri Schiavo was a person
with a disability would open the door for others to use the ADA as an
additional source of challenge to factual or legal issues that have already
been litigated in state courts merely because the person involved has a
disability. Indeed, any case of guardianship, surrogate decisionmaking,
or proxy decisionmaking with respect to healthcare (or any other matter)
would be subject to an ADA challenge. Thus, using the ADA to unsettle
guardianship and medical decisionmaking processes is problematic for
people with disabilities who need conclusive resolution to their cases.
Congress did not intend the ADA to be a roving challenge to any deci-
sion under state law involving people with disabilities; rather, it was
meant as a challenge to discriminatory treatment of people with disabili-
ties.193 We consider below whether there are reasons for altering this
balance of federal and state statutory and constitutional law as a more
general matter.
Since Schiavo began, Florida has continued to reconsider, refine,
and amend its guardianship law.'94 This is as the process should be. In
this process, one can expect that Florida will reach many different con-
clusions in this complex legal arena. Whatever conclusions it reaches,
191. See cases cited supra note 2.
192. See, e.g., Jay Wolfson, The Rule in Terri's Case: An Essay on the Public Death of
Theresa Marie Schiavo, 35 STETSON L. REv. 39 (2005).
193. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., Committee Substitute for House Bill 457, H. 2006-178, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006)
(amending Florida guardianship law), 2006 Fla. ALS 178 (LEXIS).
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however, are of course subject to challenge as a matter of federal law.
For example, Congress could attempt to use its powers under the Spend-
ing Clause or the Commerce Clause to federalize guardianship or medi-
cal decisionmaking. 95 Any such efforts, however, would surely be
subject to constitutional challenge and would, we think, be unwise for
the reasons we outline below.
Florida guardianship and medical treatment law could also be sub-
ject to challenge under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Several commentators have recognized that to challenge
Florida law under the Due Process Clause would require changing the
currently accepted framework in this area for balancing state judgments
and federal constitutional limitations. For example, Professor Robert
Burt has argued that absent a clear statement of the patient to the con-
trary, either as to treatment wishes or the choice of a surrogate, courts
should protect the interests of even a single dissenting family member in
ensuring that life-sustaining treatment is not withdrawn.' 96 Burt terms
this a constitutional right of "family" privacy, but does not specify the
degree of relational closeness required for the right.' 9 7 Professor
Edward Larson has argued that Schiavo complied with current statutory
and constitutional law and that Florida statutory law is like the law in
most states; he thinks the current constitutional picture should be undone
to be more protective of life.1 98
These judgments, however, would inject a set of vitalist values into
constitutional law. In the next section, we argue that this imposition
rests on a flawed understanding of the welfare of people with intellectual
disabilities.
V. THE SCHIAVO CASE AND UNDERSTANDING THE GOOD OF PEOPLE
WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES
A final explanation of the Schindlers' position - and of the con-
cers raised by some advocates on behalf of people with disabilities -
rests on the importance of protecting life. One version of this view
revolves around vitalism with a voluntarist exception: we must protect
life unless the person whose continued life-sustaining treatment is under
scrutiny has directly and explicitly stated a set of wishes to the contrary.
Another version of the view is vitalism with a best interest exception:
195. Congress can impose many regulations on the provision of healthcare through its exercise
of the Spending Clause power for Medicare and Medicaid; it can also use its powers under the
Commerce Clause to prohibit discrimination in healthcare or to regulate pharmaceuticals.
196. Burt, supra note 190, at 439.
197. See id. at 450-51.
198. See Edward J. Larson, From Cruzan to Schiavo: Similar Bedfellows in Fact and at Law,
22 CONST. COMMENT. 405 (2005).
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we must protect life unless there is clear evidence .that life-sustaining
treatment would not be in the person's best interest. An even stronger
version of this view - the straight vitalist approach - eschews the excep-
tions and mandates preservation of life unless life-sustaining treatment
would be futile.
From a voluntarist vitalism perspective, the numerous, ongoing
challenges to the discontinuation of Terri Schiavo's treatment were justi-
fied because the evidence in the case never rose to the standard set for
the voluntarist exception. From the best interest vitalism perspective,
continued treatment was justified unless there was clear and convincing
evidence it was not in Terri Schiavo's best interest. From the straight
vitalist view, the continued challenges were justified because continua-
tion of the feeding tube was life-sustaining, regardless of any additional
evidence about Terri Schiavo's prognosis, interests, or reconstructed
wishes. In this section, we argue that each of these vitalist views rests
on accounts of the good for people with intellectual disabilities that evi-
dence a form of paternalism that is problematic. We start with the
straight vitalist view.
From the straight vitalist perspective, life-sustaining treatment
should be continued for people with intellectual disabilities unless the
care would be futile. Life itself is a paramount value for the intellectu-
ally disabled despite any other considerations. In its strictest form, this
view would dictate the continuation of treatment even if the treatment
would be extraordinarily painful or intrusive.' 99 This view imposes a
value - the importance of life - on formerly competent adults despite
any evidence about their prior preferences or current experiences. It is
thus a moralistic form of paternalism because it holds that life is a pre-
emptive value for someone despite evidence about interests or prefer-
ences. Such moralist paternalism is not beneficial for people with
disabilities: it imposes a view of the good on them while ignoring who
they actually are in the process.
In best interest vitalism, evidence about a person's best interest
could override the value of preserving life. While it might appear that
this view would permit the withdrawal of very painful life-sustaining
treatment, that conclusion is dependent on the definition of "best inter-
199. The "Baby Doe" regulations come close to this view for newborns, requiring continuation
of treatment unless the infant is "chronically and irreversibly comatose" or treatment would be
"virtually futile" and under the circumstances "inhumane." See 45 C.F.R § 1340.15 (2006); see
also Larry Gostin, A Moment in Human Development: Legal Protection, Ethical Standards and
Social Policy on the Selective Non-Treatment of Handicapped Neonates, II AM. J.L. & MED. 31,
36 n.16 (1985); Loretta M. Kopelman, Are the 21-Year-Old Baby Doe Rules Misunderstood or
Mistaken?, 115 PEDIATRICS 797, 801 (2005) (criticizing the regulations and arguing'that they
require treatment against reasonable medical judgment based on the best interest of the infant).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
est." In bioethics, the "best interest" standard is complicated. For
example, the New Jersey courts have characterized the standard as an
"objective" one. 2" An "objective" standard could conceivably refer to a
list of positive values that supposedly apply to everyone, regardless of a
person's particular experiences or circumstances.2' In other words,
courts can make judgments about what certain kinds of people need to
survive, but these are simply objective judgments about biological
needs. These survival necessities might include needs for nutrition,
hydration, protection from the elements, and any instrumental interven-
tions required to keep bodily systems functioning. But it is poorly rea-
soned not to adapt this list to the particular individual whose condition is
under consideration: for example, although humans need protein, people
who cannot take oral nutrition cannot eat meat and must receive protein
in another form. This much seems clear, but what of the experiences of
the particular person, such as pain? In developing its "best interest"
standard, New Jersey thought that it should take into account the current
experiences of the person, such as experiences of pleasure and pain.2 °2
At least one commentator has criticized other states for apparent disa-
greement with this view.20 3
People in PVS, like Terri Schiavo, have no conscious exper-
iences. 2' Thus, no experiences are available that can nuance the objec-
tive list, either to support or to modify it. Any determination that
continued life-sustaining treatment would or would not have been in
Terri Schiavo's interests, therefore, would have rested on a non-experi-
ential account of her interests - that is, on an account of interests based
on a "one size fits all" view. Some courts20 5 and commentators 20 6 have
concluded that people in PVS have no interests at all; these theorists
hold that experiences, among other factors, are necessary conditions for
interests.20 7
A non-experiential account of interests, like the straight vitalist
view, is paternalistic. According to such a view, something is in some-
one's interests even though it has no connection to his or her exper-
200. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
201. This view is characterized as an "objective list" theory. See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND
PERSONS 493 (1984).
202. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1233.
203. See Alicia R. Ouellette, When Vitalism Is Dead Wrong: The Discrimination Against and
Torture of Incompetent Patients by Compulsory Life-Sustaining Treatment, 79 IND. L.J. 1, 10
(2004).
204. Cerminara, supra note 5, at 350.
205. See, e.g., In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419 (N.J. 1987).
206. See, e.g., JEFF MCMAHAN, THE ETHICS OF KILLING: PROBLEMS AT THE MARGINS OF LIFE
443-50 (2002).
207. See, e.g., id.
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iences. It is simply "good" for him or her, even if he or she has no
experiential interests that support this judgment. It thus represents a
judgment about someone's good that is unsupported by the subjective
life of the person to whom the good supposedly belongs. Using such a
non-experiential account of interests in making treatment decisions is
not, we contend, good for people with disabilities. It lets a series of
judgments about what would be "good" for people to determine what
people must have, regardless of their actual experiences, much less any-
thing that might be known about their wishes. It ignores them, in short,
in favor of outside judgments about what is good for them. And ignoring
who they are is not good for people with disabilities.
At first glance, voluntarist vitalism would appear to avoid this diffi-
culty because it permits a patient's choices to override the presumption
in favor of life-sustaining treatment.20 8 But this appearance is illusory
for two reasons. First, the vitalist presumption itself assumes that life is
good for a person, regardless of anything about the person's own docu-
mented views. The exception for the person's own documented views
then lends a second reason. If the exception is formulated to require that
there be an actual statement of what the person wanted for his or her
exact circumstances - as it would be if the point of the exception is to
grant it only in cases of actual choice - the exception as a practical
matter will never be met when patients no longer have the capacity to
speak for themselves.2 09 The default presumption will then prevail in all
cases. The result will once again be the paternalistic imposition of the
value of life despite other knowledge of the person who cannot speak for
him or herself.
Formulating the voluntarist exception more broadly allows evi-
dence about the person - his or her current experiences and circum-
stances, together with what is known about his or her prior activities,
statements, wishes, and values - to override a presumption in favor of
life. It thus tailors a decision to the person, even if the person cannot
speak for him or herself.210 This broader formulation of the voluntarist
exception is not paternalistic, and it is the standard that was actually
used in Schiavo, where the court scrutinized evidence that it found to be
208. See, e.g., Dorothy Grover, Posthumous Harm, 39 PIL. QUARTERLY 334, 339 (1989).
209. See generally Alan Meisel, Suppose the Schindlers Had Won the Schiavo Case, 61 U.
MIAMI. L. REV. 733 (2007).
210. We have developed elsewhere the view that being able to formulate one's good
independently is not necessary for a liberal theory of the good, although such theories of the good
must be individually scripted and rooted in the person's own psychological life. See Leslie
Francis & Anita Silvers, Liberalism and Individually Scripted Ideas of the Good: Meeting the
Challenge of Dependent Agency, 33 SOCIAL THEORY & PRACTICE (2007).
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clear and convincing with respect to her wishes.21" '
As an example, consider the Schindlers' claims about Terri Schi-
avo's Catholicism. The Schindlers contended that Terri Schiavo was a
Catholic and would have wanted Catholic preservation-of-life values to
be used in making decisions about her care.21 2 They presented no evi-
dence about her commitment to Catholicism or her commitment to her
parents' views about Catholic values during her adult life, however.213
Had there been evidence of such commitments, there might have been
reason to think that Terri Schiavo would have incorporated these Catho-
lic values into her decisionmaking framework. Without such evidence,
however, the claim could only be that she should be treated as a Catholic
because it is part of her good, without any basis for judging Catholicism
to be hers - to be valued subjectively by her or to play an experiential
role in her life. As we have argued, externally imposing values that may
not be their own on people with disabilities makes them subject to a
problematic form of paternalism.
VI. CONCLUSION
Terri Schiavo was a person with a disability. She was not, how-
ever, a victim of disability discrimination. Arguments that the decision
to terminate her medical treatment was discriminatory rested on views
that should be challenged by advocates for the civil rights of people with
disabilities. One set of arguments, that Terri Schiavo was not in PVS,
relied on distrust of science. A second set of arguments, which chal-
lenged the guardianship and medical treatment decisions made under
Florida law, would bring such instability to guardianship and medical
treatment decisions that the authorization of treatments that are needed
by individuals with disabilities could be compromised. A third set of
arguments, that the Florida decisions should be challenged because of
the importance of preserving life, rested on a position that would impose
a view of the good - that is, impose moralistic or paternalistic judgments
about their good - on people with disabilities. Schiavo is a disability
case, to be sure, but it is misframed if it is viewed as a case of discrimi-
nation against a person with disabilities.
211. See supra notes 181-191 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. See generally cases cited supra note 2.
213. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
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